Required Readings

• William Burr, ed., “‘How Much is Enough?’: The U.S. Navy and ‘Finite Deterrence,’” National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 275, May 1, 2009.

• Sir Michael Quinlin, Easements and Escape Routes, in Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 99-104.

• Henry Sokolski, Nuclear Deterrence Lecture Notes, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. September 2023.

• Albert Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, paper P-1472 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, November 6, 1958).

Recommended Readings

First Thoughts on Nuclear Deterrence

• William L. Borden, There Will Be No Time: The Revolution in Strategy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946).

• Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, preliminary draft for Restricted Distribution, February 15, 1946 (New Haven, CT: Yale Institute of International Studies, 1946), 14-89.

• J. Franck, et al. “The Franck Report,” reprinted in Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 560-565. Password Protected PDF

• Zay Jefferies, et al., “Prospectus on Nucleonics (The Jeffries Report),” reprinted in Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 539-559. Password Protected PDF

• Dexter Masters and Katherine Way, ed., One World or None. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946). Password Protected PDF

• National Committee on Atomic Information, “One World or None,” filmed 1946, YouTube video, posted by FA Scientists, 9:12, posted August 5, 2013.

https://youtu.be/eM7-4Ikyw08

• Louis N. Ridenour, “There is No Defense,” in One World or None, ed. Dexter Masters and Katherine Way (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1946). Password Protected PDF

• Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists’ Movement in America, 1945-47 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

Part 1 and 2: Password Protected PDF

Part 3: Password Protected PDF

Part 4: Password Protected PDF

• Jacob Viner, “The Implications of the Atomic Bomb for International Relations,” in Symposium on Atomic Energy and its Implications: Papers read at the joint meeting of the American Philosophical Society and the National Academy of Sciences, November 16 and 17, 1945 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1946). Password Protected PDF

Robust Nuclear Deterrence: Requirements and Practice

• Always Never, the Quest for Safety, Control, and Survivability. YouTube video by the National Security Archive, December 23, 2014.

• Keith B. Payne, “Why Do US Nuclear Force Numbers Matter for Deterrence?” National Institute for Public Policy, Information Series no. 404, March 9, 2016.

• Glenn H. Snyder, ‘‘Deterrence and Defense,’’ reprinted in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: University Press of America, 1983), 56-76. Password Protected PDF

• Albert Wohlstetter, Fred S. Hoffman, Robert J. Lutz and Henry S. Rowen, Selection of Strategic Air Bases, special staff report R-244-S (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, March 1, 1953), and special staff report R-266 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, April 1954).

• Albert Wohlstetter, Fred S. Hoffman and Henry S. Rowen, Protecting U.S. Power to Strike Back in the 1950’s and 1960’s, staff report R-290 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, September 1, 1956), top secret, declassified circa mid-1960s.

• Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 1962).

• William C. Yengst, et al., “Nuclear Weapons that Went to War,” draft final report DNA-TR-96 (Alexandria, VA: Defense Special Weapons Agency, October 1996).

Origins of “Finite Deterrence”

• Commander P.H. Backus, “Finite Deterrence, Controlled Retaliation,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 85, no. 3 (March 1959), 23-29.

• Pierre Marie Gallois, Strategie de l’age nucleair (Paris: Francois-Xavier de Guibert, 1960).

• David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960,” in Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence: An International Security Reader, ed. Steven E. Miller (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 113-181. Password Protected PDF

• Harvey Sapolsky, “The U.S. Navy’s Fleet Ballistic Missile Program and Finite Deterrence,” in Henry Sokolski, ed. Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practices (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 123-135.

• Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2004).

• Bruno Tertrais, “‘Destruction Assurée’: The Origins and Development of French Nuclear Strategy,” in Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice, ed. Henry Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 51-122.

• David S. Yost, “France’s Nuclear Deterrence Strategy: Concepts and Operations Implementation,” in Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice, ed. Henry Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 197- 237.

Proliferation:  A Plus or Minus for Deterrence?

• Matthew Fuhrmann, “Preventive War and the Spread of Nuclear Programs,” NPEC Working Paper 1221, (Arlington, VA: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, June 28, 2012).

• Steven Kidd, “Nuclear proliferation risk – is it vastly overrated?” Nuclear Engineering International, July 23, 2010.

• Matthew Kroenig, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?” in Moving Beyond Pretense: Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2014), 45-89.

• John Mueller, “Deterring World War III: Essential Irrelevance” in Atomic Obsession:  Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda (New York, NY:  Oxford, 2010), 29-42. Password Protected PDF

• Bruce Mueno de Mesquita and William Riker, “An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 (1982): 283-306.

• Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York:  W.W. Norton, 1995).

• Henry D. Sokolski, ed., “Should We Let the Bomb Spread?,” (Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2016).

Accidents and Illicit Use

• Peter Burt, Playing With Fire: Nuclear Weapons Incidents and Accidents in the United Kingdom (Reading, UK, Nuclear Information Service, February 2017).

• Scott Sagan, “Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994).

• Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

• Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety (New York: Penguin Press, 2013).

• Eric Schlosser, “World War Three, by Mistake,” The New Yorker, December 23, 2016.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons and First Use

• Elbridge Colby, “Russia’s Evolving Nuclear Doctrine and its Implications,” Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégique, No. 1 (January 2016). 

• Michael Krepon, “Not Just Yet for No First Use,” Arms Control Wonk (blog), July 31, 2016.

• Fredrik Logevall, “’We Might Give Them a Few.’ Did the US Offer to Drop Atom Bombs at Dien Bien Phu?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 21, 2016.

• Jeffrey D. McCausland, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Operational Myths and Realities,” Stimson Center Analysis, March 10, 2015.

• Clark Murdock, et al., “Project Atom: A Competitive Strategies Approach to Defining U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Posture for 2025-2050,” CSIS Reports, Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 2015.

• Sir Michael Quinlin, “Easements and Escape Routes,” in Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 99-111. Password Protected PDF

• Josh Rogin, “U.S. Allies Unite to Block Obama’s Nuclear ‘Legacy’,” The Washington Post, August 14, 2016.

• Scott Sagan, “The Case for No First Use,” Survival 51, No. 3 (June-July 2009): 163-182.

• Mark Schneider, “The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2006).

What Might Nuclear Deterrence Require Today?

• William Burr, “SAC Nuclear Planning for 1959,” The National Security Archive, December 22, 2015

• Brian Chow, “Stalkers in Space: Defeating the Threat,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Summer 2017): 82-116.

• Benjamin Friedman, Christopher Preble, and Matt Fay, “The End of Overkill: Reassessing U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,” CATO Institute, 2013.

• Michael S. Gerson, “The Origins of Strategic Stability: The United States and the Threat of Surprise Attack,” in Elbridge A. Colby and Michael S. Gerson, eds., Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations (Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013), 1-46.

• Victor Gilinsky, “What if the taboo on nuclear weapon use is broken,” Paper prepared for 15th PIIC Beijing Seminar, October 16, 2016.

• Peter Huessy, “In Defense of the Nuclear Triad,” Defense One, October 18, 2013.

• Keith Payne and Matthew Costlow, “Nuked: Destroying the Myth of Minimum Deterrence,” The National Interest, December 12, 2014.

• Mark B. Schneider, “Countering Putin’s Nuclear Threats,” Real Clear Defense, July 06, 2022.

• Sara Scoles, “New Space Robots Will Fix Satellites, Or Maybe Destroy Them,” Wired, September 10, 2018.

• Harold Smith and Raymond Jeanloz, “Britain Leads the Way to Global Zero,” Arms Control Today 40, no. 10 (December 2010).

• Madina Ali Zamani, New Wars and the Fallacies of Traditional Deterrence Approaches, Modern Diplomacy, August 30, 2020.

How Effective is Nuclear Deterrence?

• Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: Times Books, 2012).

• Chris Ford, “The Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” Hudson Institute, March 17, 2011.

• Matthew Furhman and Todd S. Sechser, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

• Victor Gilinsky, “On Tickling the Dragon’s Tail,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 26, 2016.

• Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

• Tod Lindberg, “Nuclear and Other Retaliation After Deterrence Fails,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), pp. 317-339.

• John Mueller, “Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter,” Foreign Affairs, October 15, 2018.

• Sebastien Roblin, “Madmen With Nuclear Codes — An History of Unpredictable Foreign Policy,” War is Boring, November 22, 2016.

• Ward Wilson, “The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence,” Nonproliferation Review 15, no. 3 (November 2008): 421-439.

• William C. Yengst, et al., “Nuclear Weapons that Went to War,” draft final report DNA-TR-96 (Alexandria, VA: Defense Special Weapons Agency, October 1996).

 

 

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