Articles I, II, and VI: New Issues for the NPT

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• Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

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• Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

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 Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

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- --do not create a fait accompli

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Duties inhering in a duty to pursue negotiations:

- --do not aggravate the situation
- --do not create a fait accompli
- --negotiate!

China after Russia's Belarus deployment

https://press.un.org/en/2023/gadis3712.doc.htm (Oct. 5, 2023)
(Business as usual)

https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N23/091/67/PDF/N2309167.pdf?OpenEle ment (Mar. 31, 2023)

(China all but calls out Russia at the UNSC)

China's March 31, 2023 UNSC statement

 "Nuclear weapons are the sword of Damocles hanging over our heads... China attaches great importance to the status of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as the cornerstone of international nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation... We call for the abolition of nuclear-sharing agreements and oppose the deployment by all nuclear-weapon States of nuclear weapons abroad. We support the withdrawal of nuclear weapons deployed abroad."

S/PV.9300 p. 21.

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S/PV.9300 p. 21. CONTEXT: Security Council meeting on Russia's deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus.

(Or what is there left to negotiate?)

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Some possibilities:

-Transparency

(Or what is there left to negotiate?)

- -Transparency
- -Confidence-building

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- -Hotlines

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- -Hotlines
- -Plutonium production and fuel-cycle accountability

(Or what is there left to negotiate?)

- -Transparency
- -Confidence-building
- -Hotlines
- -Plutonium production and fuel-cycle accountability
- -Safeguards for fast reactors and keeping the IAEA in the picture

(Or what is there left to negotiate?)

Some possibilities:

(continued)

-Nuclear testing-let's talk definitions (CTBT framework)

(Or what is there left to negotiate?)

Some possibilities:

(continued)

- -Nuclear testing-let's talk definitions (CTBT framework)
- -Nuclear safety

(Or what is there left to negotiate?)

Some possibilities:

(continued)

- -Nuclear testing-let's talk definitions (CTBT framework)
- -Nuclear safety
- -Export controls

(Or what is there left to negotiate?)

Some possibilities:

(continued)

- -Nuclear testing-let's talk definitions (CTBT framework)
- -Nuclear safety
- -Export controls
- -Institutionalizing the NPT

(Or what is there left to negotiate?)

Some possibilities:

(continued)

-Put nuclear sharing and Pacific Rim deployment on the table (!)

But for what in return?

(Or what is there left to negotiate?)

Some possibilities:

(continued)

-Put nuclear sharing and Pacific Rim deployment on the table (!)

But for what in return?

Some or all of the above?

Pu production and fuel-cycle accountability/moratorium