# UNDERESTIMATED: OUR NOT SO PEACEFUL NUCLEAR FUTURE

By Henry D. Sokolski
Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center

www.npolicy.org

#### **QUESTIONS AND BRIEF ANSWERS**

1. Where have we been, where are we now, and where are we going with regard to nuclear weapons proliferation?

The first nuclear arms race was between two super powers. The next one will be between more contestants with highly destructive capabilities far more closely matched and capable of being quickly enlarged than in any other previous period in history. This could make it more difficult to know how dangerous our enemies are and how much we can rely on our friends


2. How do we think about nuclear weapons and their proliferation?

Three schools of thought dominate — we should go to zero (arms control), maintain a robust nuclear deterrent (hawks), stop worrying about deterrence so much (academic). All have good points. None are entirely practical


#### 3. Is there a happy ending?

Maybe, but only if nonproliferation and nonuse hold long enough for new generation warfare to push nuclear weapons further into the background.

#### THE NUCLEAR STATE OF PLAY IN 1962




#### FOUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES IN 1962




#### THE CURRENT NUCLEAR STATE OF PLAY




## FROM U.S. STRATEGIC DOMINANCE TO A COMPRESSED NUCLEAR CROWD




## PROLIFERATION PRESENT: AN OFFICIAL VIEW





# EXISTING FISSILE STOCKPILES: GRIST FOR NUCLEAR RAMPUPS AND BREAKOUTS

**National Stockpiles of Highly-Enriched Uranium** 



**National Stockpiles of Separated Plutonium** 

## JAPAN: SITTING ON AN ARSENAL'S WORTH OF PLUTONIUM



Japan's stock of separated plutonium could decline slowly - or climb rapidly if Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant operates **Enough for** 6,000 -12,000 60 Reprocessing nuclear weapons starts in 2021 50 Metric tons of seperated plutonium No reprocessing, 30 Maximum MOX use\* \ 20 UK has offered to take title to Japan's plutonium held there (for a price to be determined) 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

Rokkosho

#### **ENRICHING URANIUM FOR WHAT?**



**Rokkasho Uranium Enrichment Plant** 

232 SWU required to make 1 kg HEU Conservatively, in 2020, over 2,500 weapons worth for PRC, over 300 for Japan

## PROJECTED PRC ENRICHMENT SURPLUSES BEYOND POWER REQUIREMENTS ~ THOUSANDS OF BOMBS PER YEAR



**Hanzhong and Lanzhow** 



**Plant 814** 

232 SWU required to make 1 kg HEU

120,000 SWU required to refuel 1-GWe reactor with LEU annually

## KNOWN CHINESE REPROCESSING PLANTS



200 tHM/year plant is now under construction: ~400 bombs worth of pu/yr




50 tHM/yr Pilot plant: ~100 bombs worth of plutonium/yr



Planned 800 tHM/yr EDF plant: ~1600 bombs worth of pu/yr

## "PEACEFUL" PLUTONIUM WILL PILE UP



## **NOTIONAL CHINESE WEAPONS MATERIALS PRODUCTION OPTIONS — TO** 2025 AND 2030

#### **PLUTONIUM**

Existing 2 HWRs,	650 kgs./year of WgPu
Planned 2 AHWRs	650 kgs/year of WgPu
2 1-Gwe LWRs	300 kgs./year of WgPu
600 Mwe CFR.	200 kgs/year of WgPu.


<b>2025</b> 3,250 kgs	<b>2030</b> 6,500 kgs
	<b>2030</b> 3,250 kgs
2025 1,500 kgs	<b>2030</b> 3,000 kgs
	2030 800 kgs
<b>2025 4,750</b> kgs	2030 10,050 kgs

#### **URANIUM**

Medium case running Plant 814


**2025** 30,000 kgs **2030** 60,000 kgs.

#### **OUR PROLIFERATION FUTURE?**



## FROM 2 NUCLEAR CAPABLE MISSILE STATES TO AT LEAST 26


1962 2 missile states




## FROM 2 NUCLEAR CAPABLE MISSILE STATES TO AT LEAST 32

2020

32 missile states



## WHERE OVERLAPPING MISSILE RANGE ARCS CONCENTRATE



## NEXT ADVANCED MISSILE THREAT: ACCURATE

**MASS DESTRUCTION?** 

- Abqaiq
- Beirut blast
- · Azerbaijan/ Armenia
- · Houthis and Hezbollah













Burkan-2H

#### WHAT WE THINK: THREE SCHOOLS

- 1. Arms Control Perspective
- 2. Hawkish Supporters of Nuclear Weapons
- 3. Academic Skeptics
  - Finite Deterrence Enthusiasts
  - Finite Deterrence Critics

#### ADDITIONAL SLIDES

#### WHAT MIGHT HELP

War gaming as we did in early 1980s

Work backward from futures we want and those we wish to avoid to create countryspecific nonproliferation strategies

Make nonproliferation and deterrence two sides of a single strategic coin

Announce a policy not to target cities with nuclear weapons

Deter further NPT withdrawals and violations


Push for a timeout, on recycling spent fuel and on further expansion of enrichment capacities, staring with the pacific rim and the middle east

Renounce nuclear targeting of cities


Synchronize our space force and missile modernization efforts with new harder headed controlled diplomacy

## ESTABLISHED NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMS


#### **1962 – 3 countries**



## FURTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPRESSION?



## YAMANTAU, UNDERGROUND GREAT WALL, DPRK TUNNELS & IRAN















## ESTABLISHED NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMS

#### 2017 - 31 countries



## WHAT'S NEXT: MORE NUCLEAR POWERED STATES, MOSTLY IN SCARY PLACES

States Planning to Have Their First Nuclear Power Reactor by 2032



Countries shown in beige already have established nuclear power programs

### THE NEXT ARMS RACE

## WHAT'S DRIVING GLOBAL STRATEGIC COMPETITIONS: IT ISN'T NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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