

# FIGHTING PROLIFERATION WITH INTELLIGENCE: THREE MODELS AND THEIR CURE

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# **THIS LECTURE IS DRAWN FROM A 3-YEAR RESEARCH PROJECT**

- **“Speaking Truth to Nonproliferation”**
- **Engaged over 50 senior and mid-level retired and serving policy makers and intelligence officers**
- **Commissioned 8 nuclear proliferation primary histories, including India, Pakistan, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, Libya, Argentina, and South Africa**
- **Based on months of group discussion and private conversations**

# QUESTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED

- I. **What approaches for intelligence and policy making are relevant to promoting effective arms control and nonproliferation?**
- II. **How well do these models explain historical cases of nuclear proliferation?**
- III. **What might be sensible, additional models to help guide nuclear nonproliferation intelligence and policy making?**
- IV. **What is needed to support these additional approaches?**

# SHORT ANSWERS

- I. **The three approaches relevant to arms control and nonproliferation emphasize that intelligence:**
  - I. Be timely and actionable
  - II. Work a proliferation detection and verification timeline continuum
  - III. Keep a wall between policy and intelligence for objectivity
- II. **How well do these models explain historical cases** Not well
- III. **What might be sensible, additional models** Work backwards from the future
- IV. **What is needed to support these additional approaches**  
Prioritizes nonproliferation, conducting long-term planning, and bringing town to gown

# **3 POPULAR INTELLIGENCE-POLICY CONCEPTS RELEVANT TO SUPPORTING NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION**

# 1. TIMELY, ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE: RARE BUT CRITICAL



**German ship BBC China loaded with illicit centrifuge enrichment parts in Dubai in late summer departs. Boarded October 3, 2003, Taranto, Italy, cargo seized**


# 2. WORKING THE PROLIFERATION DETECTION-VERIFICATION TIMELINE CONTINUUM

## 1. Set limits



## 2. Monitor activities & detect violations

## 3. Verify violations

## 4. Take enforcement action



Set nonproliferation redlines unilaterally or by agreement



Detect possible redline violations

No violations detected




Verify (confirm) violation



Enforce with: demarches, sanctions, covert or military actions



### 3. KEEPING A "WALL" BETWEEN POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE TO PREVENT FACT FIXING





# **SPECIFIC CASES**

# ISRAEL




French agree to build Dimona, 1957, UK-Norwegian heavy water 1959



Argentina sells Israel 80-100 tons of UO8, 1960-63. US confirms 1962



Kennedy, Ben Gurion, Eshkol agree to inspections, 1963



1968 200kgs UO8, German ship, Belgian ore, US aware (73)




Golda Meir & Richard Nixon 1969




Numec Plant, Apollo, PA 91-272 kgs., 65-76




1986 London Times, weapon mock-up



# S. ATLANTIC FLASH, 1979: VELA SATELLITES DETECT LIGHT PATTERN OF NUCLEAR TEST



Light pattern for a  
known nuclear test



Light pattern of an  
unknown event on 9/22/79

# THE 3 MODELS AND THE ISRAELI CASE

1. US did not act despite relatively "timely, actionable intelligence." Ben Gurion asked for US security guarantees in July of 1958. Israeli government debated if guarantees might make nuclear weapons unnecessary.
2. Intelligence & nuclear control violations were not just ignored; they were denied.
3. Policy makers generally did not cook intelligence so much as ignore it or explain it away. Ultimately, intelligence may have chosen to pull punch with policy makers.
4. Similarities with Indian, Pakistani, Iraqi, Iranian, and North Korean cases

# TAIWAN AND SOUTH KOREA



In 1969, Taiwan purchased a small heavy water research reactor from Canada.




Former South Korean President  
Park Chung-Hee

# THE 3 MODELS & TAIWAN & ROK

1. **Acted on first indications: Arguably, before the intelligence was even clearly "actionable," i.e., before there was a weapon to destroy or a public "trigger" event.**
2. **Hardly any "violations" of a clear set of nonproliferation red lines – weapons manufacture was still years off.**
3. **In each case, there was close cooperation between intelligence and policy such that each was informing the work of the other. Not much of a wall.**
4. **Successful Libyan nuclear and Argentine & South African nuclear-capable missile cases share some of these attributes**

**WHAT ADDITIONAL, NEW MODELS MIGHT  
HELP GUIDE NONPROLIFERATION  
INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY MAKING?**

# ACT TO THE LEFT OF THE PROLIFERATION DETECTION & VERIFICATION TIMELINE






# WORK BACKWARDS FROM FUTURES WE DESIRE AND THOSE WE WISH TO AVOID

Set nonproliferation redlines unilaterally or by agreement

Look for early indications of possible redline violations

Act modestly to prevent proliferation before the violation is public



**Avoid the worst futures and promote the optimal ones before any proliferation redlines are clearly crossed by imagining these alternative futures, tailor country-specific competitive strategies to achieve the best and avoid the worst, and set intelligence requirements accordingly**

**WHAT'S NEEDED TO SUPPORT SUCH  
NEW APPROACHES?**

# **1. GIVE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION HIGHER PRIORITY**

- A. Number of clear proliferators down to Iran and N. Korea; number of potential proliferators – Japan, RoK, S. Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Poland – is climbing again; threats of nuclear war in East and South West Asia, Europe are up. Breakout ramp-up times for batches of bombs decreasing**
- B. Congressional oversight reduced compared to 30 years ago.**
- C. Need to make a part of Defense Guidance and planning.**
- D. Proliferation gaming in Executive Branch**

## **2. PLAN BACKWARDS FROM FUTURES WE WANT AND THOSE WE WANT TO AVOID**

- A. Expand long-term planning to include joint intelligence-policy making efforts such as the Strategic Assessment Group and Strategic Interdiction Group.**
- B. Offer opportunities for long-term, joint instruction focused on specific proliferation country case histories and planning for policy, intelligence, and military staffers early in their careers (including summer studies).**

### **3. STRENGTHEN ACADEMIC SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENT NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS**

- A. Bring “town to gown,” have retired nonproliferation officials share specific case insights.**
- B. Create a repository of oral histories for the cases. Encourage academics to produce more political histories relating to nonproliferation cases.**
- C. Support year-long government legislative and Executive nonproliferation internships**
- D. Reform security regulations to enhance recruitment and historical research**