

# International Nuclear Controls: Their History and Key Premises

## Part 2: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)

A presentation by  
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# **QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED**

**I. Why should we bother understanding the NPT's original premises?**

**II. What were the premises of the first three articles of the NPT?**

**III. What were the premises behind the other NPT articles?**

**IV. How are these articles at war with one another today; what is the best way to resolve this conflict?**

# BRIEF ANSWERS

- I. The premises behind the NPT help us distinguish the NPT from the Atoms for Peace Program and are critical to understanding how to interpret the NPT's conflicting provisions.**
- II. Articles I-III of the NPT were designed to limit the threat of catalytic wars that would become more likely if nuclear weapons spread horizontally.**
- III. Articles IV, V, VI, and X were designed to encourage sharing “peaceful nuclear energy” and to keep the superpowers from proliferating nuclear weapons vertically. These articles presumed states could defend themselves “finitely” with a few nuclear weapons and that they should be compensated for not exercising their right to this self defense.**
- IV. If the NPT is to be a “nonproliferation” treaty, the rights and concerns of articles IV, V, VI, and X need to be subordinated to and interpreted through the concerns of articles I-III.**

## **II. THE PREMISES OF THE FIRST THREE ARTICLES OF THE NPT: THE IRISH RESOLUTIONS (1958-1961)**

# IN THE 50S & 60S, SUPERPOWERS SPREAD NUCLEAR WEAPONS GLOBALLY

## US NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENTS

NATO ~7,000

Okinawa ~1,300

Guam ~ 600

Taiwan ~75

South Korea ~ 900

Philippines ~250

US naval vessels ~2,000 to  
~3,000

## SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENTS

Cuba – 158?

Poland hundreds?

Hungary hundreds?

# NOT SCORES, JUST 1 WEAPON A THREAT: CATALYTIC, ACCIDENTAL, & UNAUTHORIZED WARS

**F-104 Starfighter, 1950s-60s**  
**“Widow Maker”**



**Davy Crockett, 1950s-60s**




**Nuclear B-47 crashes (4 in '50s)**



**Suez, 1956**



# 1958 STUDY EMPHASIZED THESE PROLIFERATION DANGERS



# **IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER PROPOSED NPT AT THE UN, CITING THIS ANALYSIS, 1958**



**Frank Aiken**



# **AIKEN FEARED MORE NUCLEAR STATES WOULD COMPLICATE DISARMAMENT**

**“the problem of achieving international arms control will become vastly more difficult when the three powers having nuclear weapons are joined by a fourth, and then a fifth, and possibly more.”  
National Planning Assoc., *1970 Without Arms Control*, p. 10.**

# **AFTER SUEZ CRISIS, AIKEN ALSO FEARED CATALYTIC WAR**

**“Irresponsible ‘mischief-making’ by one small nation could catalyze a nuclear conflict between larger powers, or might cause preexisting nonnuclear hostilities to escalate into nuclear hostilities.”**

**- Davidson, et al., *The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control*, xi.**

# **WHAT DID THE IRISH RESOLUTIONS VIEW AS SAFE AND DANGEROUS**

## **Safe**

- **Small research reactors**

## **Potentially Dangerous**

- **Large reactors**
- **Nuclear fuel making**

# **WHY SHOULD NON WEAPONS STATES WELCOME SAFEGUARDS**

- **Safeguarding civilian facilities would serve as test bed for procedures to verify nuclear limits and disarmament of nuclear Superpowers**
- **Preventing one's neighbors from getting nuclear weapons made safeguards a bargain**

### **III. THE PREMISES BEHIND THE OTHER NPT ARTICLES: THE SWEDISH RESOLUTION & ITS AFTERMATH (1961-1968)**

# SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER REQUESTS STUDY, PROMPTS ARTICLES 4-10








Östen Undén

# NUCLEAR PLOWSHARES SEEMED ATTRACTIVE






# SUPERPOWER ARMS RACING CIRCA 1960





# MORE ARMS RACING IN THE LEADUP TO THE NPT



From NRDC "Table of Global Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles, 1945-2002" <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab19.asp>

# MULTILATERAL FORCE: 1964 MIXED MANNING EXPERIMENT



# FINITE DETERRENCE IN EARLY 1960S



**1<sup>st</sup> French Nuclear Test, *Blue jerboa*,  
Feb. 13, 1960**



**Polaris SLBM**



**1<sup>st</sup> Stockpiled French Nuclear Weapon, AN-11**

# **WHAT'S VIEWED AS SAFE: AN NPT SECOND CUT, THREE CONDITIONS**

- **Must be non-explosive and declared to be peaceful**
- **Must have a conceivable civilian application**
- **Must be inspected internationally**

# WHAT'S ALLOWED: A PERMISSIVE TAKE

“knowledge, materials and equipment cannot be denied to a non-nuclear-weapon State until it is clearly established that such assistance will be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices...there should be a clear presumption that the assistance rendered will not be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.”

*- Henri Eschauzier, Dutch Delegate to the First Committee, May 1968*

# CONCERNS ABOUT NUCLEAR FUEL MAKING NEVER JOINED



**Alva Myrdal**  
**Swedish Minister for Disarmament**



**Sir Michael Wright**  
**UK Permanent Rep. to the UN**  
**Disarmament Conference, Geneva**

# WHAT'S DANGEROUS: A CONSERVATIVE TAKE

“The thing which is unique to a nuclear weapons is its warhead. And **what is there in a nuclear warhead that is found in no other weapons?...It is the fissile material** in in the warhead; that is to say, the plutonium and uranium-235...”

- Sir Michael Wright, UK Delegate, ENDC Sept. 1962

“To block the road to nuclear weapon development as early as possible...we are facing...a long ladder with many rungs, and the practical question is on which of these is it reasonable and feasible to introduce the international blocking?...**To prohibit just the final act of ‘manufacture’ would seem to come late...**”

- Alva Myrdal, Swedish Delegate, ENDC Feb 1966

“An undertaking on the part of the non-nuclear weapon Powers **not to manufacture nuclear weapons would in effect mean forgoing the production of fissionable material**...and such production is the first essential step for the manufacture of these weapons and constitutes an important dividing line between restraint from and pursuit of the nuclear path.”



- U. Maung Maung Gyi, Burmese Delegate, ENDC March 1966



# SUBSEQUENT REPROCESSING & SAFEGUARDS EMBARRASMENTS

## Simple, Quick Reprocessing Plant Designed to Make As Many as 20 Bombs a Month (Ferguson-Culler)

10-day startup, 1 bomb's-worth-a-day production rate



### Sellafield (UK)

29.6 kg Pu MUF (material unaccounted for) Feb. 2005  
190 kg Pu in "leak" undetected for 8 months  
Cogema-Cadarache (France)  
Euratom report 2002,  
"unacceptable amount of MUF,"  
2yrs to resolve

### Tokai Mura (Japan)

MOX, 69 kg Pu MUF (1994)  
Scrap 100-150 kg Pu MUF (1996)  
Pilot reprocessing 206 kg - 59 kg Pu MUF (2003) Commercial reprocessing 246 kg/yr Pu MUF (2008?)



# SUBSEQUENT ARTICLE X EMBARRASMENT



**March 12, 1993:** Kim Il Sung announces NPT withdrawal

**June 11, 1993:** Kim Il Sung suspends withdrawal



**October 21, 1994:** Agreed Framework b/w USA & DPRK



KEDO Reactors

**January 10, 2003:** Kim Jong Il announces NPT withdrawal is finalized

**October 9, 2006:** First North Korean Nuclear Weapon Test



Yongbyon LWR

**IV. HOW ARE THESE ARTICLES OF THE  
NPT AT WAR WITH ONE ANOTHER; WHAT  
IS THE BEST WAY TO RESOLVE THIS  
CONFLICT?**

# 3 PILLARS VIEW OF THE NPT MAKES 3 OBJECTIVES EQUALLY IMPORTANT



# FIRST USE OF THE 3 PILLARS MONIKER

**["NPT] rested on three pillars:** the balance between the obligation of militarily non-nuclear countries not to acquire nuclear weapons and the commitment of militarily nuclear countries to discharge their obligations under the Treaty in the matter of nuclear disarmament; the balance in the security conditions of Parties to the Treaty and the balance in the technological conditions and possibilities of all States which had acceded to the Treaty."

*- Italian Representative, 1975 NPT Review Conference*

# ALTERNATIVE VIEW: ONE PILLAR, TWO STRUTS

