International Nuclear Controls Exam Click “next” to start the exam. Only one possible answer for each question. 1. How did the authors of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the Baruch plan view the strategic military threat posed by nuclear weapons? a. The aggressor has the upper-hand, but a defensive system is possible b. The aggressor will win if it can knock-out 100 cities c. The aggressor always wins; there is no defense; the prime target is cities d. A second strike capability can negate the offensive nature of nuclear weapons 2. What did the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and Baruch Plan propose to mitigate or eliminate the threat of atomic war/nuclear proliferation? a. Creation of an international authority to control and take ownership of all dangerous nuclear materials and activities b. Nuclear weapons states contribute stores of fissile material to an international stockpile for peaceful purposes c. Nonnuclear weapons states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons if the nuclear states agree to disarm d. Nations should be free to attack any state they suspect is trying to develop nuclear weapons without reference to any findings by the International Atomic Energy Authority e. None of the above 3. Which of the following facilities and activities were originally considered safe nuclear activities and materials by the authors of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report? a. Uranium mining and processing sites b. Reactors optimized for power production c. Breeder reactors d. Reactors powered by natural uranium e. Uranium enrichment plants that produce LEU 4. Which of the following facilities and activities were considered dangerous nuclear activities and materials by the authors of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report? a. Reactors optimized to make plutonium b. Nuclear fuel fabrication c. Uranium mining and enrichment d. Researching nuclear explosives e. All of the above 5. Why did the authors of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report conclude that a system based solely on international inspections of nuclear activities would not be effective? a. Because if states could own or operate dangerous activities or materials, they would be so close to bomb making there would be no way to prevent them from taking the last step b. The very notion that materials and activities might be diverted to bomb making would foster mutual suspicions that could itself prompt bomb making by other states c. Countries could never agree on an international inspections system d. A and B e. A and C 6. The timely warning criteria that we talk about today for safeguards is the same idea that is discussed in the Acheson-Lilienthal report when they talk about time adequate in relation to safeguards. What does time adequate refer to? a. Detection of the diversion of fissile material for military purposes b. Detection of the diversion of fissile material before a nuclear weapon is built c. Detection of possible nuclear military diversions early enough to allow outside authorities to intervene to prevent bombs from being made d. Detection of the possible detonation of a nuclear weapon before it occurs e. None of the above 7. The Acheson-Lilienthal Report assumed that, with regard to uranium: a. There was a severe scarcity of uranium globally b. No one but the United States and Soviet Union would be able to develop uranium enrichment technology c. It would be impractical to try to control and account for all sources of uranium globally d. Controlling thorium mining would be even more difficult than controlling uranium mining e. None of the above 8. In the Baruch Plan, what was proposed that was NOT included in the Acheson-Lilienthal report? a. That the international authority must own, manage, and operate all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle b. That consensus of all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council was not required before action could be taken against a violator. Instead, action could be taken with only a majority’s approval c. That any and all violations should prompt an immediate invasion by outside powers to prevent a nuclear bomb from being build d. All of the above 9. The military threat posed by nuclear weapons described by the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and Baruch Plan: a. Went too far in arguing that there was no defense and deterrence was impossible b. Assumed deterrence was feasible c. Thought the prime targets were strategic air bases d. All of the above e. None of the above 10. What specific nuclear threat was Eisenhower and the creators of the Atoms for Peace program seized with? a. A surprise knockout blow by the Soviets that would cripple the industrial capacity of the United States b. The development of thermonuclear weapons by the Soviet Union c. The ability of a state to seize several bombs worth of weapons usable material from civilian activities d. All of the above e. None of the above 11. In trying to eliminate the threat of knockout blows against American military industrial capacity, Eisenhower’s original Atoms for Peace proposal a. Mistakenly assumed that the diversion of hundreds of bombs’ worth of fissile material was the only threat to be concerned about b. Was very concerned about making sure that the fissile material could be stored in a manner that would make the theft or diversion of a bomb’s worth of material extremely difficult c. Required that the IAEA inspectorate be able to demand all spent fuel be sent back to banks that the IAEA would maintain for safe keeping d. A and B e. B and C 12. Which of the following was wrong with Eisenhower’s vision of the next nuclear war? a. It ignored the vulnerability of SAC air bases b. It thought civil air defenses could totally protect America c. It presumed that simply destroying a few Soviet cities would be sufficient to deter Soviet aggression d. All of the above e. None of the above Name Email Time's up
